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Abstract
User interaction constitutes a largely unexplored field in protocol analysis, even in instances where the user takes an active role
as a trusted third party, such as in the Internet of Things (IoT) device initialization protocols. Initializing the formal modeling
of 3-party authentication protocols where one party is a physical user, this research introduces the 3-party possession user-
mediated authentication (3-PUMA) model. The 3-PUMA model addresses active user participation in a protocol which
is designed to authenticate possession of a fixed data string—such as in IoT device commissioning. Using the 3-PUMA
model, we provide a computational analysis of the ISO/IEC 9798-6:2010 standard’s Mechanism 7a authentication protocol
which includes a user interface and interaction as well as a device-to-device channel. Furthermore, we introduce existential
unforgeability under key collision attacks (EUF-KCA) and provide a corresponding security experiment. We show that
the security of ISO/IEC 9798-6:2010 Mechanism 7a relies upon EUF-KCA MAC security. Since it is unknown whether any
standardizedMAC algorithm achieves EUF-KCA security, this research demonstrates a potential vulnerability in the standard.
Keywords Authentication Protocols · Key distribution · User Interface · MAC Security · Key Collision Attacks
1 Introduction
While work has been carried out on modeling of 3-party—
and more generally multi-party—key exchange protocols
[9,16,17,26,35], 3-party authentication protocols are largely
ignored. Analyses of many 3-party key exchange proto-
cols handle the user as an out-of-band (OOB) information
exchange [17,35]. Indeed, this follows from standard practice
where security is only considered device-to-device and iden-
tification of a device’s user is considered irrelevant or external
to the cryptographicmodel. However, in a user-mediated pro-
tocol, the user is an active participant relaying and confirming
information and even generating nonces or keys, instead of
a simple possessor of a device. It is thus possible to consider
a user-to-device “channel,” e.g., a device keypad or display,
as well as adversarial behavior on this channel. For example,
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. The views
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an adversary may have a priori access to a device and may
therefore be able to manipulate inputs/outputs.
ISO/IEC 9798–6:2010 Mechanism 7a Analysis One such
user-mediated protocol is ISO/ IEC 9798–6:2010 Mecha-
nism 7a [23] (abbreviated Mechanism 7a) a authentication
protocol, originally published in [21]. Unlike previously
analyzed ISO/IEC 9798 protocols, protocols within the
ISO/IEC 9798–6 standard employ an active user interface.
Furthermore, the goals of Mechanism 7a differ also from
those expected from typical mutual authentication protocols;
instead of entity authentication, Mechanism 7a achieves a
form of data authentication, which can be seen as a ver-
sion of “aliveness” [31]. In the absence of long-term keys
and symmetric keys, etc., which could normally be used for
entity authentication, the goal of Mechanism 7a is to pro-
vide a mutually authenticated data string D, such that both
parties are assured that the protocol partner has also agreed
to the string. Protocol participant identities are assumed to
be known a priori, but no verification takes place during the
protocol. In fact, the only intended prevention mechanism
against man-in-the-middle attacks is a user-generated value,




3-PUMA Model This research introduces the 3-party pos-
session user-mediated authentication (3-PUMA) model, for
protocols with an active user protocol participant and authen-
tication of mutually held data. Application of the 3-PUMA
model extends beyond the current analysis of ISO/IEC 9798–
6 Mechanism 7a, and has implications for analysis of other
common IoT protocols which demand user interaction for
authentication. Furthermore, this extends previous research
on other ISO/IEC 9798 authentication protocols which do
not demand a user interface.
EUF-KCA MAC Security The security goals of Mechanism
7a’s underlying message authentication code (MAC) algo-
rithm differ not only from the standard’s currently assumed
MAC goals, but also from all accepted MAC security
assumptions (e.g., EUF-CMA and SUF-CMA). Mechanism
7a sends a one-time MAC key in the clear, before verify-
ing the MAC tag. Thus, the MAC must be secure against an
adversary that can produce a different, but valid MAC key—
essentially producing a key forgery, given amessage–tag pair.
In order to address these demands, we formalize key collision
attacks (EUF-KCA). We cross-compare EUF-KCA security
with other standard security assumptions. The non-standard
reliance on EUF-KCA security calls into questions the secu-
rity of Mechanism 7a. It is currently unknown which, if any,
standardized MAC algorithms achieve EUF-KCA security.
Related Work Previous analyses of the ISO/ IEC 9798
standard have mainly addressed mechanisms in the stan-
dard which do not include a user interface [4,22,41]. These
analyses include both symbolic modeling [4,41] and com-
putational modeling [22]. None of these works cover any
of the protocols of ISO/IEC 9798–6, but demonstrate the
importance of analyzing such standardized protocols. One
exception to the above list undertakes capturing the user inter-
face in ISO/IEC 9798–2 and 4 using symbolic analysis [19].
However, symbolic and computational analyses differ con-
siderably in the scope and detail of the analysis performed
[18]. Computational analysis, as is used in this work, enables
a detailed view of the underlying algorithms, such as the
EUF-KCA security assumption discussed above.
Classically, we assume that an adversary cannot access an
algorithm’s secret key. This applies to MACs, digital signa-
tures, etc.; if an adversary obtains the key and can generate
new MACs or signatures with it, security is lost. However,
this classical approach inherently assumes that changes to a
MAC tag or digital signaturewould not be noticed. Naturally,
this is the casewith document signatures,where generation of
a new signature on an edited document yields an apparently
valid message–signature pair. Yet, Mechanism 7a contains
a different scenario, one in which MAC tags are essentially
“committed” to. Then, even if the key is revealed, the tag
cannot be altered and an adversary must generate a message
forgery that corresponds to the fixed tag, or produce an alter-
native key.
Known-Key, Chosen-Key, and Related-Key attacks bear
some similarities to the present adversarial MAC challenge
of producing a new key given a known key; however, it is
important to note that these differ from the present case.
Known-Key attacks (KKAs) were introduced in [27] and
cover the case of block ciphers, where an adversary knows a
key and aims to exhibit non-random behavior in the cipher.
KKAs have been studied extensively [2,14,20,33,38–40].
Chosen-Key attacks (CKAs) consider a similar situation,
but where an adversary may choose the key in question
[13,30,36]. In aRelated-Key attack (RKA) [11], an adversary
chooses a relation between a pair of keys for a blockcipher,
but not the keys themselves, before launching a chosen plain-
text attack. Much research has been done on RKAs, both
in the development of practical attacks and in the theoret-
ical definitions [3,5–7,12,15,32,34]. As KKAs, CKAs, and
RKAs are aimed at block ciphers, they can be relevant for
MAC security, and RKAs have already been considered in
the context of MACs [10,28]. However, the intrinsic goal of
these attacks (e.g., non-random behavior in the cipher in the
case of a KKA) is different from the goal of the MAC adver-
sary exhibited in Mechanism 7a (generating a new key for a
given message–tag pair).
Standard MAC security variants include EUF-CMA and
SUF-CMA. In both cases, the MAC key is fixed, unlike the
MAC security demands of Mechanism 7a where an adver-
sarymay select the verification key to be used. The concept of
adversarial key guessing has surfaced previously under terms
such as key spoofing and key collision. The concept of key
spoofing was briefly discussed in [1], in terms of symmetric
encryption, as a situation where an adversary’s goal is to find
a new key which produces a given message–ciphertext pair.
Later, the idea was revived in [37] (not peer-reviewed) under
the term key collision for digital signatures. Unlike in key
spoofing, key collision demands only a fixed ciphertext—the
adversary must find a new key, and may additionally find a
new message, which yields the given ciphertext. If the mes-
sages are indeed the same, the term 1st order key collision
is employed, while 2nd order key collision is reserved for
the case of different messages. [37] demonstrates key colli-
sion in DSA and ECDSA. Still, these attacks do not consider
a related-key case, where the adversary can exploit knowl-
edge of the actual key. This leaves an open problem. How
can we formulate MAC security for when the MAC key is
intentionally provided to the adversary?
We consider a slightly different variant of the first-order
key collision goal, where the adversary not only guesses a
different valid key but is actually provided the correct key,
thus enabling attacks based on related keys, etc. Providing the
adversary with the correct validation key necessitates restric-
tion of its use, leading us to a one-time variant. We call this
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Table 1 Security experiment against a MAC algorithm with corresponding new inputs into the verification oracle (key K , message m, or MAC tag
t)
Exhaustive comparison of MAC security experiments
MAC security experiments corresponding to verification inputs which are
optionally generated by the adversary (*), required fresh for a win (), and fixed (–)
Security experiment K m t
EUF-KCA  * –
EUF-CMA –  *
Forged tag – * 
SUF-KCA   –
SUF-CMA = EUF-CMA + Forged tag –  
Trivial (win)  – 
Trivial (win)   
Trivial (impossibility) – – –
If an adversary can generate a new input () when others are fixed (-), it wins the corresponding experiment. Other inputs which the adversary
may manipulate are denoted (*). For example, an adversary wins SUF-CMA if it can generate a new MAC tag, a new message or both. For visual
completeness, we include the trivial combinations where the adversary must generate a new key–tag pair for a message (whether given or of the
adversary’s choice)
existential unforgeability under key collision attacks (EUF-
KCA), as the adversary is essentially forging an alternative
key with knowledge of a valid one. It is also possible to draw
comparisons to EUF-CMA and SUF-CMA, based on infor-
mation available to an adversary. Table 1 shows all possible
forgeries an adversary can perform and the corresponding
security game that captures such abilities. In all non-trivial
cases, either the key or message tag is fixed. Note that clas-
sical SUF-CMA fixes the key while SUF-KCA fixes the tag.
Other real-world examples existwhere aMAC tag, or even
digital signature, is committed to in advance. One could con-
sider implications of a signature variant of the EUF-KCA
model for blockchain, for example, where a digital signature
is publicly committed to and the adversary wins if it can pro-
duce a new message or key that matches the given signature.
In this case, timing plays a critical role: In Mechanism 7a, an
adversary must complete the EUF-KCA forgery during the
protocol run, while in the described case of signatures the
allowed attack time frame is extended.
Since we allow the adversary full control of the key
between generation of a MAC tag and verification, the
EUF-KCA security model falls in between the typical secret-
key cryptographic assumption, where the adversary cannot
access the key, and the open-key model (used in KKA and
CKA). In the latter case, an adversary knows—or even is in
control of—the secret key.
Contributions This work extends previous research on
ISO/IEC 9798, providing a model for user-mediated authen-
tication and analyzing a previously untouched protocol.
Moreover, and in response to these new authentication goals
and challenges, the contributions in this paper include the
following:
– We introduce Existential Unforgeability under Key Col-
lision Attacks (EUF-KCA) for a MAC.
– We initiate the studyof 3-partyPossessionUser-Mediated
Authentication (3-PUMA) Protocols and provide a cor-
responding security model.
– We computationally analyze the ISO/IEC 9798–6:2010
Mechanism 7a authentication protocol under the 3-
PUMAmodel. Ultimately, we demonstrate that theMAC
requirements stated in Mechanism 7a are insufficient for
the protocol’s security.
2 Preliminaries
Here, we introduce Mechanism 7a according to the ISO/IEC
9798–6:2010 standard’s specification, as well as MAC def-
initions. The latter definitions include a standard security
experiments for a MAC (SUF-CMA), as well as MAC secu-
rity requirements per Mechanism 7a and the EUF-KCA
security experiment.
2.1 ISO/IEC 9798–6:2010Mechanism 7a
authentication protocol specification
Both devices possess a “simple output interface,” e.g., red and
green lights. They also possess “standard input” interfaces
which allow a user to input a bit-string into the devices. Fig-
ure 1 shows the Mechanism 7a protocol, with user-interface
interaction displayed in green and device-to-device message
flows displayed in blue.
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Fig. 1 ISO/IEC 9798–6:2010 protocol Mechanism 7a. Protocol flows are color-coded for the device-to-device channel and user-to-device channel.
Data string D is distributed before the start of the protocol, and identities are pre-shared
Variables
– R: A short random bit-string generated by the user. Per
ISO/IEC 9798, R should be 16-20 bits.
– D: A data string. D is the agreed upon data at the termi-
nation of the protocol run.
– KI : A short-term session key derived by identity I . Per
ISO/IEC 9798, KI should be 128-160 bits.
– macI : A message authentication code output by a
MACalgorithm. Per ISO/IEC9798, amac should be 128-
160 bits, with algorithms chosen from ISO 9797 [24,25].
– ready: An indicating signal that the device is ready for
the protocol to start.
– start: An initiation message.
– OK: An indicating signal that the protocol is completed
successfully. Alternatively, a message failed is sent.
Note that Mechanism 7a does not define the distribution
of the data string D, stating instead that it can be data trans-
ferred fromone device to other or concatenation of bilaterally
transferred data. In either case, themechanism does not begin
until after the data has been distributed.
Mechanism 7a does not specify how each party obtains
the other’s identity, but makes it a specific requirement that
identities are knownprior to the start of themechanism.Thus,
we consider the identities to be transmitted out-of-band.
Mechanism 7a does not specify how the random bit-string
R is generated, but does require it to be kept secret, as well as
recommending caution during the user-to-device transfer of
R. It should be noted that an improperly behaving user could
reuse R in different protocol runs and, without checks on the
reuse of R, this could lead to potential attacks. Following
the specification, we assume that R is generated randomly.
Additionally, we do not consider “shoulder-surfing” attacks,
where an adversary may observe R on input, in accordance
with the standard’s strict specification on the secrecy of R to
prevent man-in-the-middle attacks.
Device A, resp. B, outputs an indication of success/failure
to the user based on the MAC verification step—we indicate
this as vB = 1/0, resp. vA = 1/0. If both devices output an
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indication of success to the user (vB = vA = 1), then the
user enters a confirmation of success (OK) into both devices.
If either vB = 0 or vA = 0, the user enters an indication of
failurefailed into both devices; absence of a user response
(OK/failed) within a specified time interval is interpreted
as failed by the device.
Bit-length of keys, MACs, etc., clearly affects the secu-
rity of the protocol. However, this also linked to the threat
landscape and device capability. In this analysis, we will
forgo specific consideration of bit security levels.Mechanism
7a also requires the implementation of time-out procedures
(e.g., when a user fails to enter a confirmation OK/failed
within a specified time interval); we assume that no such
significant delays occur in the protocol execution.
We say that a protocol instance of Mechanism 7a accepts
if:
– it has received a value R from the user, and
– it outputs a verification bit vpartner identity = 1, and
– the last message received from the user is OK.
2.2 MAC security
Definition 1 A message authentication code (MAC) algo-
rithm for a message space M, a key space K, and an output
message authentication code spaceMAC is a tuple of algo-
rithms:
– Kgn(1λ)
$→ K : A probabilistic key generation algorithm
that takes as input a security parameter λ and outputs a
key K ∈ K.
– MAC(K ,m)
$→ mac: A probabilistic message authenti-
cation algorithm that takes as input a key K ∈ K and a
message m ∈ M, and outputs a MAC tag mac ∈ MAC.
– Vfy(K ,m,mac) → v: A deterministic verification algo-
rithm that takes as input a key K ∈ K, amessagem ∈ M,
and a message authentication code mac ∈ MAC, and
output is a verification bit v ∈ {0, 1}.
The authenticated message–tag pair is the pair (m,mac),
and mac is called theMAC or tag on m.
Correctness It is required for all K ∈ K and m ∈ M, that
Vfy(K ,m,MAC(K ,m)) = 1.
Mechanism 7a refers to the ISO/IEC 9797-1 standard for
MACs for use. Particularly,Mechanism7a uses the following
definition for a MAC, which we present here for comparison
and later discussion.
Definition 2 (Mechanism 7a MAC [23]) AMAC algorithm
is an algorithm for computing a function which maps strings
of bits and a secret key to fixed-length strings of bits, satis-
fying the following properties:
Fig. 2 Security experiment for strong unforgeability (SUF-CMA) of a
message authentication code algorithmMAC = (Kgn,MAC,Vfy) and
adversary A
– for any key and any input string, the function can be
computed efficiently;
– for anyfixedkey, and given noprior knowledge of the key,
it is computationally infeasible to compute the function
value on any new input string, even given knowledge of
the set of input strings and corresponding function values,
where the value of the ith input string may have been
chosen after observing the value of the first i-1 function
values.
In juxtaposition to the above definition, we present the fol-
lowing security games for a MAC, which will be used in the
analysis of Mechanism 7a.
Definition 3 LetAbe aPPTadversarial algorithmagainst the
MAC. The one-time strong unforgeability (OT-CMA) exper-
iment forMAC,ExpOT-SUF-CMAMAC,A is givenby the strongunforge-
ability (SUF-CMA) experiment ExpSUF-CMAMAC,A per Fig. 2, with
the additional restriction that an adversary may only query
MAC and MAC.Vfy once each. We define
AdvOT-SUF-CMAMAC,A (λ)
= Pr[ExpOT-SUF-CMAMAC,A (λ) = 1].
Definition 4 (One-Time Strong Unforgeability MAC Secu-
rity) We say that a MAC scheme is OT-SUF-CMA secure
if there exists a negligible function negl(λ) such that for all
123
B. Hale
Fig. 3 Security experiment for EUF-KCA of a message authentication
code algorithm MAC = (Kgn,MAC,Vfy) and adversary A
PPT adversaries A interacting according to the experiment
ExpOT-SUF-CMAMAC,A it holds that
AdvOT-SUF-CMAMAC,A (λ) ≤ negl(λ).
As discussed in Sect. 1, unforgeability under key collision
attacks is intrinsically different from Known-Key, Chosen-
Key, andRelated-Key attacks. Since theMACkey is provided
to the adversary following generation of a MAC tag, EUF-
KCA security is naturally a one-time security game.
Definition 5 Let A be a PPT adversarial algorithm against
the MAC. The existential unforgeability under key colli-
sion attacks (EUF-KCA) experiment for MAC, ExpEUF-KCAMAC,A
is given in Fig. 3. We define
AdvEUF-KCAMAC,A (λ) = Pr[ExpEUF-KCAMAC,A (λ) = 1].
Definition 6 (Existential Unforgeability under Key Collision
Attacks MAC Security) We say that a MAC scheme is EUF-
KCA secure if there exists a negligible function negl(λ) such
that for all PPT adversaries A interacting according to the
experiment ExpEUF-KCAMAC,A it holds that
AdvEUF-KCAMAC,A (λ) ≤ negl(λ).
Fig. 4 EUF-CMA security experiment for a message authentication
code algorithm MAC = (Kgn,MAC,Vfy) and adversary A
Since it considers key guessing, it is perhaps natural to
ask how EUF-KCA differs from a brute-force key search,
and why it is necessary. Unlike in a brute-force search, the
adversary in an unforgeability key collision attack actually
has a valid key at its disposal. It also possesses a complete
message triple (K ,m, t), with the goal of finding an alter-
native key. Improper handling of keys in a MAC algorithm
could enable an adversary to find a related keywhich satisfies
the message–tag pair.
The above EUF-KCA security for a MAC is particularly
necessary in Mechanism 7a. However, other key collision
variants could prove useful in other environments. Here, we
describe the security experiment for strong unforgeability
under a key forgery attack (SUF-KCA) as well a EUF-CMA
for comparison. EUF-KCA allows an adversary to win only
if it produces a valid key corresponding to a given MAC
tag—regardless of whether or not a new message is used.
In comparison, SUF-KCA allows an adversary to win if it
produces either a new key or a new message corresponding
to a given authentication tag. Table 1 shows this comparison.
The security experiments for SUF-KCA and EUF-CMA are
presented in Figs. 4 and 5, respectively.
From Table 1, it appears that SUF-KCA is a combina-
tion of EUF-CMA and EUF-KCA. However note that this is
not the case. To win EUF-CMA, an adversary may manip-
ulate the message tag in addition to the message, although
the winning requirement is on the message only. Therefore,
an adversary that can forge a new message–tag pair (m′, t ′),
which validates correctly and where both m′ and t ′ are new,
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Fig. 5 SUF-KCA security experiment for a message authentication
code algorithm MAC = (Kgn,MAC,Vfy) and adversary A
may win the EUF-CMA experiment, but does not win the
SUF-KCA experiment as the tag differs from those previ-
ously output by the MAC oracle.
3 3-PUMAmodel for simple output devices
Introducing a third-party user interface to a two-party pro-
tocol creates a unique modeling challenge. Not only must
we consider the communication channel between devices
(wired or wireless), but also the third-party user interaction
and channels between the user and devices. The 3-PUMA
model captures protocols for simple output devices (i.e.,
red and green lights or other such success/failure indication
mechanisms [23]), and is suitable for protocols which do
not possess long-term keys. We leverage partnering via ses-
sion IDs to capture the agreement between authenticating
devices instead of handling matching of all three-party tran-
scripts.
ISO/IEC 9798–6:2010 does not specify how each party
obtains the other’s identity, but requires that identities are
known prior to the start of the mechanism. In this model, we
let the adversary choose partner identities.
3.1 Protocol participants
Each device possesses a simple output interface, e.g., binary
success/failure indication, as well as a standard input inter-
face which allows a user to input a bit-string into the device.
A participant in a 3-PUMAprotocol is either a device I ∈ ID
or a user U . As there is only one user interface, we do not
model multiple users.1 The set of all participants is the union
ID∪{U }.We refer to elements of ID alternatively as devices
or identities.
Wemodel participants via sessions, such thatπ Pi is the i-th
session at P . There may be multiple and simultaneous ses-
sions at each participant, e.g., the data D may be transferred
and shared between devices before a protocol run begins.
Devices Each device I ∈ ID is modeled via session oracles,
where each sessionmaintains a list of the following variables:
– K ∈ K: a variable for storing an ephemeral key, where
K is the key space of the protocol.
– D ∈ {0, 1}∗: a variable for storing the possession
data represented by a finite binary string, as defined in
Sect. 2.1.
– role ∈ {initiator, responder}: a variable indicating the
role of I in the session.
– pid ∈ ID/{I }: a variable for storing the partner identity
for the session.
– δ ∈ {accept, reject, ∗}: a variable indicating if the ses-
sion accepts, rejects, or has not yet reached a decision.
– sid: a variable for storing the session ID.
The internal state of each session oracle at identity I is ini-
tialized to (K , D, role,pid,sid) = (∅, ∗,∅,∅,∅), where
V = ∅ indicates that the variable V is undefined and ∗ indi-
cates that the variable value may or may not be defined. In
the case of out-of-band exchange of D, D is initialized to the
agreed value; otherwise, D is initialized to ∅. In general, the
possession data D may be exchanged out-of-band or during
the protocol, and it is the explicit goal of the 3-PUMA pro-
tocol to authenticate possession of D at two sessions π Is and
π I
′
s , versus mutually authenticating parties I and I
′. Rejec-
tion of the protocol runmay occur at any time, but acceptance
does not usually occur until the protocol is complete. We dis-
allowpidI = I , with devices not authenticating themselves.
Since a 3-PUMA protocol aims to authenticate possession of
D, we require that D be included in the sid, in addition to
any other protocol elements.
1 Naturally, it is possible that two users each possess one of the devices
participating in the authentication protocol. However, by requiring the
user to behave honestly and reliably perform protocol steps, there is
no conceptual difference between multiple users and a single user in
possession of all devices.
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User U is modeled via session oracles, where each session
maintains the following variables:
– init ∈ ID: a variable indicating the initiating identity.
– resp ∈ ID: a variable indicating the responding iden-
tity.
The internal state of each session oracle atU is initialized to
(init,resp) = (∅,∅).
For devices, we use a notion of partnering based on ses-
sion IDs (sid). Note that Device-to-Device (DtD) messages
occur on a different channel than User-to-Device (UtD) mes-
sages, and partnering is defined on the DtD channel only.
Definition 7 (Matching Session ID) We say that identities I
and I ′ possess matching session IDs if sidI = sidI ′ .
Remark 1 In practice for analysis of Mechanism 7a, we
will use sid = (D, R,macA,macB, KA, KB), i.e., the
transcript shared by device protocol participants I and I ′
inclusive of the pre-exchanged data string D, and R. Selec-
tion of a session ID is non-trivial, especially in a three-party
case. We emphasize that the selection above is made using
the full transcript between I and I ′, inclusive of out-of-band
dataD, but also includes elements sent to respective identities
by the user, on the UtD channel. Results of the MAC veri-
fications are sent to the user, and therefore are not mutually
held by I and I ′, as are the ready messages, but the user’s
selection R is sent from the user to both devices and is thus
mutually held by the identities. While the confirmation mes-
sage OK is also sent by the user, as the final protocol message
a recipient cannot be guaranteed that the protocol partner has
also received themessage (i.e., it may be dropped), and there-
fore we only include message flows up until the confirmation
message. In general, we expect the user to be an active proto-
col participant generating such confirmations. Notably, this
selection of session ID can be observed from the end-goal.
The identities authenticate possession of D, but no authenti-
cation is considered with regard to user interaction. Thus, it
is natural to include messages between identities, as well as
messages received by both identities from the user.
Definition 8 (Partnering Device to Device) We say that two
sessions π Is , π
I ′
s , for I , I
′ ∈ ID, are partnered if they
both accept, and possess, respectively, (pidI ,sidI ) and
(pidI ′ ,sidI ′), where pidI = I ′, pidI ′ = I , and sidI =
sidI ′ .
Note that the above definition is Device-to-Device only.
We do not define a notion of partnering between the user and
devices as there is a single user for all devices. Note that D is
a required element of sid, therefore demanding agreement
between identities on D.
3.2 Adversarial model
We consider a probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adver-
sarial algorithm A against authentication. We define the
following abilities of A in the 3-party possession user-
mediated authentication experiment Exp3-PUMAA , including
allowed queries.
Device-to-Device (DtD) For messages between participants
I and I ′, such that I , I ′ ∈ ID, the adversary is allowed to
read, modify, replay, and delete messages.
User-to-Device (UtD) For messages sent between identities
I ∈ ID and the user U , the adversary may not modify
a message’s sender/recipient. We present three variants of
adversarial behavior allowed on the UtD channel, and use
the notation 3-PUMAi for the i-th variant:
1. Before the first DtD message, the adversary is allowed
to read, modify, replay, or delete UtD messages. Once
the first DtD message is sent, the adversary is allowed to
read, replay, and delete messages, but may not modify
UtD messages.
2. The adversary is allowed to read, replay, and delete mes-
sages, but may not modify UtD messages.
3. Before the first DtD message, the adversary is allowed to
replay or delete messages sent from a user to a device,
but may not read or modify messages. The adversary is
allowed to replay, delete or read messages sent from a
device to a user, but may not modify messages. Once
the first DtD message is sent, the adversary is allowed
to read, replay, and delete UtD messages, but may not
modify messages.
We model the user as an honest, benign, and unauthenti-
cated third party, i.e.,whichbehaves according to the protocol
specification and may not be compromised. However, we
capture a CCA1 variant (3-PUMA1) by allowing adver-
sary access to a device before the first DtD message. The
3-PUMA1 model may be suitable for protocols that expect
the user to behave as a confirmation source (e.g., assuring
that both devices output a confirmation message), but where
the user does not generate or control any secrets. 3-PUMA2
is likely the most typical user-mediated variant, capturing
shoulder surfing attacks, but forbidding active modification
of messages. 3-PUMA3 provides the most restricted view,
where the adversary may not even view messages being
sent in the initial phase. It is expected that user interaction
involving secrets (keys, random nonces, etc.) occurs before
communication on theDtDchannel; thus,we allow the adver-
sary to read messages that do not involve protocol secrets.
We distinguish between an adversary’s ability to read user
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and device messages in variant 3 based on typically required
user behavior. A user may be asked to conceal input of secret
information (e.g., pin codes into a card reader, or R in the case
of Mechanism 7a), but is rarely required to conceal informa-
tion displayed by a device or machine.
Remark 2 Note that this adversarial behavior is as expected
for a UtD channel, due to the physicality of the channel (i.e.,
user interface).While wemay consider message deletion, re-
routing/modification of the sender or receiver of message is
not realistic.We distinguish between thememory/card on the
device (used in the generation of KI ) and device input/output
mechanisms. Excluding compromise of the user or device
card, we have the following channel adversarial control sce-
narios:
– An adversary can observe inputs to devices (i.e., shoulder
surfing attacks).
– An adversary can observe outputs from a device to a user
(e.g., simple output screen or red/green lights).
– An adversary may delete or replay messages (e.g., faulty
hardware in a device).
– An adversary can modify messages output from a device
to a user (implies control of, e.g., a display or red/green
lights).
– An adversary can modify messages input into a device
(implies control of, e.g., touchpad or touchscreen).
Clearly, the last two items are only viable attack vectors
in certain sophisticated devices where control of, for exam-
ple, display output does not imply compromise of the device
secret key. This model does not consider a manipulated or
dishonest user; more particularly, the user does not relinquish
control of the devices throughout the protocol run.
Mechanism 7a specifies that partner identities are already
known to respective devices before a protocol run, but does
not specify how they are distributed. To enable maximum
flexibility in modeling, we allow the adversary to choose
partner identities when initiating devices via the following
queries.
Queries The adversary may use the following queries:
– SendDevice(π Is ,m). Using this query, the adversary
sends amessagem to a session oracle of his choice,where
π Is is an oracle for session s at a participant I ∈ ID. The
message is processed according to the protocol and any
response is returned to the adversary. If a session oracle
π Is , where I ∈ ID, receives m as a first message, then
the oracle checks whether m consists of a special initia-
tion message (m = (init, I ′)), for I ′ ∈ ID, to which
it responds by setting pid = I ′ and outputting the first
protocol message. Else it outputs ⊥.
If at any point a session oracle π Is , where I ∈ ID,
receives a message m from U during a protocol run,
such that m consists of a special role-setting message
m = start and π Is has not received a message from
another identity I ′ ∈ ID, then π Is sets role = initiator
and responds according to the initiator role in the proto-
col. Else, if π Is receives a message from another identity
I ′ ∈ ID according to the protocol without having
received such a message m = start from U , it sets
role = responder and responds according to the respon-
der role in the protocol.
– SendUser(πUs ,m). Using this query, the adversary sends
a message m to a session oracle of his choice, where
πUs is an oracle for session s at user U . The message is
processed according to the protocol, and any response is
returned to the adversary.
If a session oracle πUs receives m as a first message, then
the oracle checks whether m consists of a special initia-
tion message (m = (init, (I , I ′))), for I , I ′ ∈ ID, to
which it responds by setting init = I and resp = I ′.
Else it outputs ⊥.
– RevealKey(π Is ). This query returns the ephemeral key
KIs of the s-th session for the identity I ∈ ID. If KIs = ∅,
RevealKey returns ⊥.
In brief, the above queries are used by the adversary
to send messages to devices (SendDevice), to the user
(SendUser), and to acquire the ephemeral key used at a
device (RevealKey). The first message used in a SendUser
query must consist of an initiation message with an iden-
tity I ; this sets the initiating identity for the protocol. For a
user-mediated protocol, the user selects the device that will
start the protocol run. We specifically allow the adversary to
choose the initiating device using this message.
Definition 9 (Freshness) A session oracle π Is for an identity
I ∈ ID is called fresh unless
– a RevealKey query on π Is occurs before the last DtDmes-
sage is sent/received by π Is , or
– a RevealKey query on π I
′
s occurs before the last DtD
message is sent/received by π I
′
s , where π
I ′
s is the partner
of π Is .
3.3 Security
Here, we define authentication security, building on previ-
ous authentication security definitions [8], with inclusion of
ephemeral key reveal and session IDs per the eCK model
[29].
We rely on session IDs due to the parallel-channel
structure of the protocol. Even in an honest protocol run,
participants are not expected to possess matching transcripts
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at the end of the protocol, due to the three-party interac-
tion. Thus, session IDs can be used to define the expected
agreement between devices. If matching session transcripts
were used, it would be necessary to extract and distinguish
between the transcripts in the DtD and UtD channels within
the protocol. In practice, the session IDmay be the DtD tran-
script in addition to any critical information provided by the
user U .
Definition 10 (3-PUMA Experiment) LetA be a PPT adver-
sarial algorithm against 3-party possession user-mediated
authentication, interacting with a challenger in the experi-
ment Exp3-PUMAA via the queries defined above. We say that
the challenger outputs 1, denoted Exp3-PUMAA (λ) = 1, if
either of the following conditions hold:
1. Failure of (matching sid → acceptance).
– Oracles π Is and π
I ′
s have matching sid and
– either π Is or π
I ′
s does not accept.
2. Failure of (acceptance → matching sid).
– There exists a fresh oracleπ Is which has accepted and
– there is no partner oracle π I
′
s which is fresh.
Otherwise, the experiment outputs 0.We define the advan-
tage of the adversary A in the experiment Exp3-PUMAA (λ) as
Adv3-PUMAA (λ) := Pr[Exp3-PUMAA (λ) = 1].
Note that, as an adversary cannot corrupt the userU ,modi-
ficationofmessages on theUtDchannel requires aRevealKey
query on the device. The above definition therefore allows
for maximum flexibility for the adversary.
Definition 11 (Security of 3-PUMA) We say that a 3-party
possession user-mediated authentication protocol is secure
if there exists a negligible function negl(λ) such that for all
PPT adversaries A interacting according to the experiment
Exp3-PUMAA (λ), it holds that
Adv3-PUMAA (λ) ≤ negl(λ) .
4 Security analysis
As stated in Sect. 3.2, we define sid =
(D, R,macA,macB, KA, KB) forMechanism 7a. Given the
protocol, as presented in Fig. 1, we now consider security
with respect to theMAC requirements presented in Sect. 2.2.
As ISO/IEC 9798–6:2010 Mechanism 7a requires strict pri-
vacy with regards to R, we use the 3-PUMA3 model. In
contrast, ISO/IEC 9798–6:2010 Mechanisms 1–6 do not
require the same form of secrecy; 3-PUMA2 would be amore
suitable variant in such cases.
Theorem 1 (Security of ISO/IEC 9798–6:2010 Mechanism
7a) Let ISO be the Mechanism 7a protocol and let A be a
PPT adversarial algorithm against the 3-PUMA3. Let q be
a polynomial bound on the number of queries allowed to A
and let p = |ID|. Then, we can construct adversaries B0
and B1 against the OT-SUF-CMA and EUF-KCA security of
the MAC, respectively, such that
Adv3-PUMA3ISO,A (λ)
≤ (2p2 + 1) · AdvOT-SUF-CMAMAC,B0 (λ)
+ 2p2 · AdvEUF-KCAMAC,B1(λ) + q2/2n .
where n is the prescribed bit-length of R.
Proof To prove security, it is necessary to address both cases
in Definition 10. Checking the first case is trivial. Therefore,
this proof will focus on the second case.
In this proof, wewill follow a series of game hops between
an attackerA and a challenger, where the adversarial advan-
tage in Game i is denotedAdvi . Let q be a polynomial bound
on the number of queries allowed to A. The challenger gen-
erates a set of identities for potential protocol participants
ID, where p = |ID|.
Game0 This is the same as the original security experiment,
thus
Adv0 = Adv3-PUMA3ISO,A (λ).
Game 1 This game is identical to Game 0 except for the
addition of an abort condition. We raise the event abort
and abort the experiment, outputting a random bit, if there
ever exist two session oracles which generate the sameMAC
key. Thus,
Adv1 ≥ Adv0 − Pr[abort].
By a straightforward reduction to the security of theMAC
algorithm, we can construct an adversary B0 against the OT-
SUF-CMA security of the MAC. B0 possesses aMAC oracle
which it uses to compute message authentication codes for
identity A, per the ExpOT-SUF-CMAMAC experiment, run on a ran-
domkey KA
$← Kgn(), and aMAC.Vfy oracle.When identity
A sends a message (A, D, R), B0 calls MAC(A, D, R) and
returns t = macA.B0 then generates an additional p−1 keys
Ki
$← Kgn() and computes Vfy(Ki , (A, D, R),macA) for
each i ∈ [p−l], using theVfy algorithm. If there exists i such
that 1 ← Vfy(Ki , (A, D, R),macA), then B0 can trivially
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compute macwin
$← MAC(Ki , (A, D, R)), a new MAC on
A’s message. Since macA = macwin , the new MAC will
verify correctly in MAC.Vfy, despite never being generated
byMAC (as MAC is probabilistic), and therefore B0 wins the
ExpOT-SUF-CMAMAC experiment. Thus, we have
Pr[abort] ≤ AdvOT-SUF-CMAMAC,B0 (λ),
and
Adv1 ≥ Adv0 − AdvOT-SUF-CMAMAC,B (λ).
Game 2 This game is identical to Game 1 except for the
addition of an abort condition. We raise the event abort
and abort the experiment, outputting a random bit, if there
ever exists two session pairs for which the user generates the
same R value. Thus,
Adv2 ≥ Adv1 − Pr[abort],
and
Adv2 ≥ Adv1 − q2/2n .
Game 3 This game is identical to Game 2 except that we
guess the pair of authenticating devices uniformly at random
and abort if A does not try to win the authentication experi-
ment against the guessed pair. From the birthday paradox we
have
Adv3 ≥ 1/p2 · Adv2.
The challenger starts the protocol run with guessed identi-
ties A and B. We replace the generated ephemeral keys with
randomkeyswhichwill be used inMACoracles. If the adver-
sary calls a RevealKey query on either A or B, the challenger
aborts.
In order to win, the adversary must get A or B to accept,
such that the identity does not possess a matching sid =
(D, R,macA,macB, KA, KB) with the other.
Case 1 We assume that the adversary gets A to accept incor-
rectly. Thus, the adversarymust produce a differentMAC tag
or key for which the MAC algorithm verifies correctly. We
can therefore construct an efficient attacker B0 against the
OT-SUF-CMA security of the MAC, or an efficient attacker
B1 against the EUF-KCA security of the MAC, such that
Adv3 ≤ AdvOT-SUF-CMAMAC,B0 (λ) + AdvEUF-KCAMAC,B1(λ).
Case 2 We assume that the adversary gets B to accept incor-
rectly. This case follows similar to Case 1. 
Remark 3 The reliance of Mechanism 7a security on the
EUF-KCA security of the MAC presents a significant issue.
EUF-KCA security is not well understood and is non-
standard. Consequently, it is unknown whether or not basic
MAC primitives, such as are recommended for use in Mech-
anism 7a, satisfy this security requirement. Due to the
subtleties in claiming EUF-KCA security, a comparison of
satisfying MAC algorithms is left for future work.
One can perhaps ask why the EUF-KCA security game
is of interest if we allow the 3-PUMA attacker to reveal
keys part-way through the protocol. Yet, such an action
mixes expected protocol behavior with adversarial abilities.
Moreover, it is important to note the difference between the
security goals of the protocol and those of the MAC algo-
rithm. It may not be the case that all 3-PUMA protocols
send ephemeral keys in the clear mid-protocol. The MAC
in ISO/IEC 9798–6:2010 Mechanism 7a is expected to be
secure even when the key is revealed before MAC verifica-
tion takes place. Intrinsically, the MAC should thus provide
the security guarantees against a key collision or related key
generation based on a known key.
As stated in Sect. 3.2, the analysis of ISO/IEC 9798–
6:2010 Mechanism 7a assumes an honest and benign user
U . However, this may not adequately represent real-world
scenarios. For example, even if the MAC verification fails
on one device during the protocol run shown in Fig. 1, a dis-
tracted user or physically present adversary may enter an OK
acceptance message on each device. Consequently, satisfac-
tion of the model and the honest and benign nature of the
user cannot be over-emphasized for achieving the security
analysis result.
5 Conclusion
User-mediated protocols are used every day in real-world
scenarios, including IoT device commissioning, decommis-
sioning, and pairing protocols. Modern users even accept
such protocols as part of their daily life, such as with mobile
phone pairing with car speaker systems. Despite this, user
modeling remains largely overlooked in protocol analy-
sis, particularly within computational analysis approaches,
and this work initiates the study of computational model-
ing of user-mediated protocols as well as the computational
analysis of other non-standard protocol interactions. As a
result of previous analyses not modeling the user, subtle
security weaknesses, such as the EUF-KCA assumption of
ISO/IEC 9798–6:2010 Mechanism 7a, have gone unnoticed.
In its current form and the stated MAC recommendations
of the standard, ISO/IEC 9798–6:2010 does not provide the
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claimed security guarantees. As such, it is advisable that
ISO/IEC 9798–6:2010 be removed from the standard until
EUF-KCA satisfying MAC algorithms can be identified and
recommended for use.
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